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I. INTRODUCTION

I remember from law school an early lesson on subject-matter
jurisdiction: it can be contested at any court level. To emphasize this point,
our professor would stand at the front of the class and say: There is no
diversity with at least $75,000 in controversy or a federal question, but
they filed the case in federal district court, what do you? The class would
shout back: Object! And he would say: Why? The class would shout back:
No subject-matterjurisdiction. This back and forth would continue its way
up to the U.S. Supreme Court where our class would be sitting in the
gallery and, upon hearing that there was no federal question or diversity
with at least $75,000 in controversy, the class would shout out: Objection,
no subject-matter jurisdiction! And the Supreme Court, crediting our
poignant observation, would then announce: Case dismissed!
It seemed like a simple lesson, and we laughed at the apparent overthe-top methodology our professor used to teach it. Yet, parties routinely
contest subject-matter jurisdiction and its subtle nuances with no less vigor
than the shouts my class emanated.1
1. Even as recently as January 2007, the Supreme Court articulated a standard concerning
a court's subject-matter jurisdiction in patent cases. See Medimmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc., 127
S.Ct. 764 (2007) (finding jurisdiction to challenge patent validity where licensee paid royalty fees
in protest). On March 26, 2007, the Federal Circuit similarly addressed the standard for a
declaratoryjudgment action. Sandisk Corp. v. STMicorelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (explaining that "where a patentee asserts rights under a patent based on certain
identified ongoing or planned activity of another party, and where that party contends that it has
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To be sure, in any litigation, many factors affect a party's case strategy.
Patent cases are no different. In addition to a solid understanding of the
facts, a litigator must also appreciate the scope of the law and how it can
affect the case. 2 The issue of a court's subject-matterjurisdiction is present
in any litigation. As we learned in our law school class, in order to
entertain a suit, a federal court must have subject-matter jurisdiction
throughout the litigation.3
One area in patent litigation where subject-matter jurisdiction plays an
active role concerns the interplay between the Declaratory Judgment Act
and a covenant, or stipulation, not to sue. For example, a party can file suit
seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement against a patentee.
That same party can also seek a declaratory judgment that the patent lacks
validity or enforceability. But in order for the court to entertain the suit, it
must have subject-matter jurisdiction. That is to say, the party seeking the
declaratory judgment must establish that it faces a reasonable
apprehension of suit and presently engages in potentially infringing
activity, or has taken concrete steps thereof.4
In response to a declaratory judgment action of noninfringement,
invalidity, or unenforceability, a patentee can take certain actions to divest
a court of jurisdiction. For instance, courts recognize that a patentee
defending against a declaratory judgment can divest the court of
jurisdiction by filing a covenant not to sue or stipulation of
noninfringement.5
District courts, however, disagree about the reach of these covenants,
or stipulations, not to sue. More particularly, district courts disagree as to
whether a patentee who files a narrowly tailored covenant not to sue that
concerns only a portion of patent claims divests the court of jurisdiction
over those claims.6

the right to engage in the accused activity without license, an Article III case or controversy will
arise...").
2. See, e.g., ROBERT L. HARMON, PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION OF PATENTS AND THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT, at xi (8th ed. 2007) ("The bulk of the book is devoted to substantive patent law,
with emphasis on how those issues arise in infringement litigation.").
3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 810 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(l).
4. BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
5. See, e.g., Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
6. Cf Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., No. Civ. 02-1331-SLR, 2004 WL 2790498
(D. Del. Nov. 22, 2004) (retaining jurisdiction), and Honeywell Int'l v. Univ. Avionics Sys. Corp.,
288 F. Supp. 638 (D. Del. 2003) (retaining jurisdiction), with Biogen, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 913 F.
Supp. 35 (D. Mass. 1996) (divesting jurisdiction).
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Though the law lacks ideal clarity, an analysis of the Declaratory
Judgment Act, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit case law, and
district court case law provides insight into the matter. One reaches the
conclusion that a patentee can file a covenant not to sue for individual
claims and thereby divest the court of subject-matter jurisdiction over
those particular claims concerning their validity or infringement. But
where a party seeks a declaratory judgment of unenforceability against a
patentee, a court ought to retain jurisdiction over the claims even when a
select portion of them are the subject of a covenant or stipulation not to
sue.
II. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT
A wealth of information surrounds the Declaratory Judgment Act.7 As
a brief overview, in 1919, legislators first proposed the Declaratory
Judgment Act to Congress.8 During 1927 and 1928, the Supreme Court
heard three cases that concerned state declaratory judgment laws. 9 The
Court in each instance held the state laws unconstitutional for lack of a
"case or controversy."' 0 In 1933, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed these
earlier holdings and upheld a state declaratory judgment law."
This cleared the way for the Constitutionality of the 1934 Act.' 2 In
1934, Congress passed the Declaratory Judgment Act.' 3 The Act reads in
part,

7. Donald L. Doemberg & Michael B. Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the Declaratory
JudgmentAct Createda CauseofAction and Expanded FederalJurisdictionWhile the Supreme

Court Wasn't Looking, 36 UCLA L. REV. 529 (1989); Lisa A. Dolak, DeclaratoryJudgment
Jurisdiction in Patent Cases: Restoring the Balance Between the Patentee and the Accused

Infringer,38 B.C. L. REV.903 (1997) (examining and critiquing the Federal Circuit standard of an
imminent suit as defeating the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act); Russell B. Hill & Jesse
D. Mulholland, Effective Use of the DeclaratoryRemedy in the Patent Context, 13 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 43 (2004); Lawrence M. Sung, Intellectual PropertyProtection or Protectionism?
DeclaratoryJudgment Use by Patent Owners Against ProspectiveInfringers, 42 AM. U. L. REV.

239 (1992).
8. Doemberg & Mushlin, supra note 7, at 561-62.
9. Id.at 529, 559-60.
10. Id.(citing Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70 (1927); Liberty Warehouse
Co. v. Burley, 276 U.S. 71 (1928); Willing v. Chi. Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274 (1928)).
11. Id. at 568-69 (citing Nashville v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933)).
12. Id.
13. Doernberg & Muslin, supra note 7, at 561.
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In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction,.., any court
of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be
sought. 14
In the patent context, the Act allows a party, when appropriate, to
challenge a patent's validity or enforceability, and obtain a judgment of
noninfringement with or without first being sued for infringement.15 This
controversy,
serves the Act's purposes of terminating uncertainty,
16
parties.
among
relations
legal
clarifying
and
insecurity,
III. BACKGROUND OF PATENT LITIGATION
Article 1, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution forms the basis for patent
rights. It maintains that an inventor is awarded a patent for the disclosure
useful Arts."' 7
of a patentable invention "[t]o promote the Progress of ....
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office will award a patent to an inventor
when the invention meets several statutory obligations.' 8 Though not
required, patentees often submit, and are awarded, patents with numerous
claims. The claim language defines the invention.' 9
When a party infringes a patent's claims-that is to say the party
practices the invention disclosed in the patent and covered by the claim
language-a patentee may file suit against that party.20 The patentee may
allege infringement of one or more of the patent's claims. Under the
Declaratory Judgment Act, the alleged infringer may counterclaim that the
patent is invalid, not infringed, or unenforceable. 2' Also under the

14. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1988).
15. See, e.g., Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1058-60 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
16. Hill & Mulholland, supra note 7, at 46.
17. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
18. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989) (explaining
that the government will award patents for new, useful, and non-obvious inventions).
19. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also
Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(holding that it is a "bedrock principle" of patent law that "the claims of a patent define the
invention").
20. Additionally, a party may sue for infringement based upon one or several patents.
21. See Intellectual Prop. Dev. v. TCI Cablevision of CA, Inc., 248 F. 3d 1333, 1342 n.9
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting no consequence whether declaratory counterclaim concerns
noninfringement and invalidity or noninfringement, invalidity, or unenforceability).
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Declaratory Judgment Act, a party may bring suit against a patentee even
when22 the patentee has not filed suit, so long as certain pre-conditions, are
met.
Until recently, parties needed to face a "reasonable apprehension" of
suit.2 3 However, the Federal Circuit modified this requirement and stated
that when, "a patentee asserts rights under a patent based on certain
identified ongoing or planned activity of another party, and where that
party contends that it has the right to engage in the accused activity
without a license, an Article III case or controversy will arise and the party
need not risk a suit for infringement by engaging in the identified activity
' Generally speaking, the
before seeking a declaration of its legal rights."24
new standard looks to adverse positioning as opposed to "reasonable
apprehension." This new standard stemmed from license cases where the
courts determined the patentee improperly wielded both a shield and a
sword.
While the Federal Circuit modified the "reasonable apprehension"
standard, in the context of court entered and binding covenants or
stipulations not to sue, and those entered after litigation has commenced,
the analysis of this Article remains the same.25
IV. STRATEGY IN FASHIONING A LAWSUIT

The issue of subject-matter jurisdiction and individual patent claims
has relevance not only as a matter of academic discourse, but also in the
practical world of patent litigation.
For example, assume that your client is a patentee and brings suit
alleging infringement of two patents. The complaint alleges that all claims
in both patents are infringed. During the course of discovery, prior art is
disclosed that clearly invalidates some claims in one of the patents. As a
patentee you may want to enter into a covenant not to sue concerning those
few, selected claims. This will prevent the issue of invalidity from being
determined in a summary judgment proceeding. It will also keep any
determination of invalidity concerning those claims away from a jury.

22. BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
23. Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1381-82 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. dismissed,
125 S. Ct. 351 (2004).
24. Sandisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
25. Id. at 1382-83. Notably, in Sandisk, the Federal Circuit rejected the patentee's nonbinding "promise" that it would not sue. This does not equate to a court-entered covenant or
stipulation not to sue, or similar binding presentation made to a court equivalent to a court-entered
document.
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This is important because an issued patent enjoys a presumption of
validity. 26 But if a jury sees that prior art clearly invalidated some claims
of an issued patent, it may hold that presumption less highly, or,
consciously or not, suspiciously view the remaining claims as to their
validity. Determining your course of action, whether to enter into a
covenant not to sue concerning the whole patent, or the patent in part,
should be based on the law. The law, however, especially at the district
court level, will not provide a clear answer.
Ideally, an attorney will only enter into a covenant not to sue for those
claims invalidated by prior art. That way, the attorney can still assert the
remaining claims, and perhaps more importantly for their client, include
any later-found infringement of those claims in a damages analysis. If an
attorney must enter a covenant not to sue concerning the patent in its
entirety--or risk informing the jury that prior art invalidates some of its
claims by not entering any covenant-the attorney may lose grounds on
which to base patent infringement damages.
V. COURT PRECEDENT INVOLVING DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
ACTIONS, COVENANTS NOT TO SUE, AND ALL PATENTS IN SUIT

As previously stated, a party may bring a declaratory judgment action
against a patentee for noninfringement, invalidity, or unenforceability of
that patent. In determining subj ect-matter jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit
established a two-part test.2 Specifically, "there must be both (1) an
explicit threat or other action by the patentee, which creates a reasonable
apprehension on the part of the declaratory [judgment] plaintiff that it will
face an infringement suit, and (2) present activity which could constitute
infringement or concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct such
activity., 28 Generally speaking, an "adverse party" analysis replaced the
prior "reasonable apprehension" prong, where the latter allowed more

26. 35 U.S.C. § 282; see also SRAM Corp. v. AD-II Eng'g, Inc., 465 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed.
Cir. 2006).
27. BP Chems. Ltd., 4 F.3d at 978.
28. Id. In MedImmune, the Supreme Court called into question, though did not address, the
legitimacy of the Federal Circuit's reasonable-apprehension test. Medimmune, 127 S. Ct. at 774
n. 11. The Federal Circuit addressed this test in its Sandisk opinion. There, drawing from a factspecific case during potential licensing negotiations, it articulated a broader standard than the
reasonable-apprehension test. The Sundisk court also dismissed a simple oral and nonbinding
promise not to sue-not submitted to the federal court or stipulated to under oath in court
proceedings-as voiding the federal court's of subject-matter jurisdiction. Sandisk, 480 F.3d at
1382-83. But the Federal Circuit left untouched for another day the second part.
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assertive action by a patentee or licensee. Where a party seeks a
declaratory judgment, but does not satisfy the two part test, a court must
not entertain the action and render a "forbidden advisory opinion."'2 9
Federal Circuit precedent clearly establishes that no reasonable
apprehension exists where a patentee enters a covenant not to sue or
otherwise stipulates to noninfringement concerning a patent in its entirety,
that is, a covenant covering all of the patent's claims. This precedent
should remain intact even with the new "adverse party" standard discussed
in Sandisk.3 ° That is, once a patentee files with the court or makes
representations to the court that it does not intend to sue, the opposing
party lacks any reason to believe that it will find itself in an adversarial
position concerning the matter subject of the covenant or stipulation not
to sue.
For example, in Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. FullerCo., Inc., the Federal
Circuit addressed the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction where a party
entered a covenant not to sue.3 1 Spectronics sued H.B. Fuller seeking a
declaratory judgment ofnoninfringement and invalidity regarding Fuller's
U.S. Patent No. 4,758,366 ('366 patent).32 Fuller filed a covenant not to
sue concerning the '366 patent.33 Then, Fuller moved to dismiss the action
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.3 4 The district court granted the
motion and dismissed the suit.35 The Federal Circuit affirmed. 36 In doing
so, the court stated that, "[Spectronics] has no cause for concern that it can
be held liable for practicing the invention claimed in the '366 patent. As
to that invention, Fuller is estopped by its statement of non liability....

29.
30.
31.
Cardinal
32.
33.

Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Sandisk, 480 F.3d at 1380-81.
Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., Inc., 940 F.2d 631 (Fed. Cir. 1991), abrogatedby
Chems. Co. v. Morton Int'l, 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
Id. at 632-33.
Id. at 633. The "Statement of Non Liability" provided:
Defendant, H.B. Fuller Co., Inc. has filed a reissue application to reissue U.S.
Patent No. 4,758,366 cancelling claims 1-18 and seeking new claims. Spectronics
has no liability to Defendants or any successors-in-interest to U.S. Patent No.
4,758,366 for infringement of claims 1-18 of U.S. Patent No. 4,758,366 and
Defendants and any successors-in-interest to U.S. Patent. No. 4,758,366 will not
sue Spectronics for infringement of claims 1-18 of U.S. Patent No. 4,758,366.

Id.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Spectronics, 940 F.2d at 638.
Id. at 637-38.
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Thus, once Fuller entered a covenant not to sue concerning the '366 patent,
the court lacked subject-matterjurisdiction because Spectronics no longer
faced a reasonable apprehension of suit.
The Federal Circuit made a similar holding in Super Sack
Manufacturing v. Chase Packaging Corp.38 Super Sack sued Chase
Packaging (Chase) alleging infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 4,143,796
and 4,194,652 ('796 patent and '652 patent, respectively).39 Chase
counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement, invalidity,
and unenforceability. 4° After discovery, Super Sack filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.41 Super Sack
"unconditionally promised not to sue Chase for infringement as to any
claims of the patents in suit with respect to any products currently
manufactured or sold by Chase. 42
The court held that Super Sack's promise not to sue, stated in its
motion papers and reported in the trial court's order-while not formally
memorialized in a covenant not to sue- sufficed to divest the district
court of subject-matter jurisdiction.43 It reasoned that "Super Sack is
forever estopped by its counsel's statement of nonliability . .

.

. This

estoppel, in turn, removes from the field any controversy sufficiently
actual to confer jurisdiction over this case." Like Spectronics, once Super
Sack stipulated that it would not sue for infringement concerning the '796
and '652 patents, the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
because Chase no longer faced a reasonable apprehension of suit.
Both Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Quadlux, Inc. and Intellectual
PropertyDevelopment v. TCI Cablevisionof CA, Inc. establish additional
Federal Circuit precedent concerning subject-matter jurisdiction and
covenants not to sue in patent cases.45 These cases further demonstrate the
38. See Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
39. Id. at 1055.
40. Id.
41. Id.at 1056.
42. Id.at 1057.
43. SuperSack, 57 F.3d at 1057, 1059-60.
44. Id. at 1059.
45. Amana Ref., Inc. v. Quadlux, Inc., 172 F.3d 852, 855 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding no
subject-matter jurisdiction exists where covenant not to sue stated Quadlux would not "assert any
claim of patent infringement against Amana under (the '005 patent] as it presently reads, with
respect to any product currently advertised, manufactured, marketed or sold by Amana, or any
product which was advertised, manufactured, marketed or sold by Amana prior to the date of this
declaration"); Intellectual Prop. Dev. v. TCI Cablevision of CA, Inc., 248 F.3d 1333, 1338-41 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (finding statement of non-liability that read "[TCI-California] has no liability to CPL or
IPD or any successors-in-interest to the '202 patent for infringement of the '202 patent and CPL
and IPD and any successors-in-interest to the '202 patent will not sue [TCI-California] for
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legal standard that when a patentee enters a covenant not to sue or
statement of non-liability concerning all patents at issue, a court is
divested of subject-matter jurisdiction. 6 Notably, these cases share the
characteristic that the proffered covenants not to sue or statements of nonliability concerned patents in their entirety, that is, with all of their claims.
VI. COURT PRECEDENT INVOLVING DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
ACTIONS, COVENANTS NOT TO SUE, AND SOME OF THE
PATENTS IN SUIT

The Federal Circuit also faced the situation where only one of many
patents originally asserted in a suit becomes the subject of a covenant not
to sue or statement of non-liability. In this situation, the court established
clear precedent that the covenant or stipulation divests the court of subjectmatter jurisdiction only over that particular patent. Therefore, a court
would act improperly if it continued to examine a declaratory judgment in
light of a covenant not to sue concerning that patent, even where the court
would have proper jurisdiction over other patents still in the litigation and
not subject to the covenant.
For example, inAugustine Medical,Inc. v. GaymarIndustries,Inc., the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that it lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction over one of five originally asserted patents subsequent
to a noninfringement stipulation.47 Augustine sued several parties
(collectively Gaymar) for infringement of five U.S. patents.48 With respect
to one of the five asserted patents, Augustine dismissed with prejudice all
asserted infringement claims and stipulated that none of Gaymar's
products infringed that particular patent.4 9 The Federal Circuit explained
that it "agrees with the district court that this stipulation and dismissal of
claims with prejudice eliminated any potential case or controversy and
thereby mooted Gaymar's claim of invalidity."5

infringement of the '202 patent" divested the federal court of subject-matter jurisdiction over
counterclaim declaratory judgment action).
46. Amana, 172 F.3d at 855-56; Intellectual Prop. Dev., 248 F.3d at 1340-42. See also
Matsushita Battery Indus. Co. v. Energy Conversion Devices, Inc., No. 96-101, 1997 WL 811563,
at *4-5 (D. Del. Dec. 23, 1997); SVG Lithography Sys., Inc. v. Ultratech Stepper, Inc., 334 F.
Supp. 2d 21, 25-26 (D. Mass 2004); Nestor v. HNC Software, Inc., No. Civ.A. 98-569L, 2001 WL
34134292, at *2 (D.R.I. Jan. 16, 2001).
47. Augustine Med., Inc. v. Gaymar Indus., Inc., 181 F.3d 1291, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
48. Id. at 1294.
49. Id. at 1304.

50. Id.
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Following the Federal Circuit's lead, as they must, several district
courts properly held that they lack subject-matter jurisdiction over a patent
when it, alone among many, becomes the subject of a covenant not to sue
or statement of non-liability. For example, in Lockformer Co. v. PPG
Industries,Inc., the district court decided that subject-matter jurisdiction
existed for only one of three PPG patents originally at issue. 5' Lockformer
filed a declaratory judgment action against PPG seeking a ruling that none
of its products or processes infringed PPG's patents, and that the patents
were invalid.5 2 Sometime after the filing of the suit, PPG conceded in filed
briefs and open court statements that Lockformer did not infringe two of
the three patents subject to the declaratory judgment action, namely U.S.
Patent Nos. 5,665,282 and 5,675,944 ('282 patent and '994 patent,
respectively).53 The district court held that PPG's representations
"eliminated any threat of future infringement suit, depriving this Court of
subject-matter jurisdiction" with respect to the validity or infringement of
the '282 and '944 patents.54 The district court, however, retained
jurisdiction over the third patent which was not encompassed within PPG's
representations of noninfringement.55
Likewise, in Level I Tech. v. C.R. Bard, the district court held that a
covenant not to sue concerning one of two asserted patents divested it of
subject-matter jurisdiction regarding that one patent. 56 Level 1 filed suit
seeking a declaratory judgment that it did not infringe C.R. Bard's U.S.
Patents Nos. 4,623,333 and 4,705,505 ('333 patent and '505 patent,
respectively) and that prior art invalidated them.57 Subsequently, C.R. Bard
submitted a covenant that Level 1 faced no liability for infringement of the
'333 patent, and that it would not sue Level 1 for making, using, or selling
of any existing product based on the '333 patent.58 The district court held
that the covenant divested it of subject-matter jurisdiction over the '333
patent, but not the '505 patent.59
Thus, case law demonstrates that where multiple patents are the subject
of a declaratory judgment action, a covenant not to sue or statement of

51.
Aug. 15,
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Lockformer Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., No. 99 C. 6799, 2001 WL 940555, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
2001).
Id. at *I.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *1, *3.
Level 1 Tech. v. C.R. Bard, 839 F. Supp. 90 (D. Mass. 1994).
Id. at 91.
Id.
Id. at 91-92.
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non-liability concerning some of those patents in their entirety will divest
a court of subject-matter jurisdiction over those particular patents.6°

VII. COURT PRECEDENT INVOLVING DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
ACTIONS, COVENANTS NOT TO SUE, AND INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS OF A
PATENT IN SUIT

The legal landscape loses its clarity, however, when individual claims
of a patent at issue in a declaratory judgment action are the subject of a
covenant not to sue or statement of non-liability. District courts charter
divergent and unpredictable paths on the issue of whether a court retains
jurisdiction over those patent claims, thereby defeating the Declaratory
Judgment Act's purpose of predictability and certainty.
Further, the Federal Circuit apparently contributed to these divergent
paths. In fact, two Federal Circuit cases can be identified as having
contributed to at least some of the district courts' confusion. These cases
are Grain Processing Corp. v. American
Maize-Products Co. and
61
Inc.
Industries,
Durham
v.
Inc.
Shelcore,
In both of these cases, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of
asserted individual patent claims. In GrainProcessing,Grain Processing
sued American Maize alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. 3,849,194
('194 patent).62 It asserted that American Maize infringed fourteen claims:
ten process claims and four product claims.63 In response, American Maize
contended that the claims were invalid.64
After filing the suit, Grain Processing withdrew its allegations that
American Maize infringed the ten process claims and "steadfastly refused
to assert infringement" of those claims. 65 The district court subsequently

60. See generally Vesture Corp. v. Thermal Solutions, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 290 (M.D.N.C.
2003) (granting motion to dismiss one of three patents in suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
where that one patent was subject to a statement of non-liability); Hewlitt-Packard Co. v. Genrad,
Inc., 882 F. Supp. 1141 (D. Mass. 1995) (dismissing invalidity and noninfringement counterclaim
because no subject-matter jurisdiction over one of two patents in suit where patentee provided
repeated assurances of non-liability for that one patent); Black & Decker, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool
Corp., 371 F. Supp. 2d 965 (N.D. I11. 2005) (dismissing counterclaims concerning a third patent and
pending application because no subject-matter jurisdiction).
61. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 621 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
62. Grain Processing,840 F.2d at 904.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 904-06.
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held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over those ten process
claims, and the Federal Circuit agreed.66
In doing so, the Federal Circuit explained that American Maize faced
no "reasonable apprehension" that it would be sued for infringement
concerning those ten process claims.67 Therefore, the district court had no
authority to entertain American Maize's invalidity contentions concerning
those claims.
In seeming contrast, Shelcore shows the Federal Circuit's concern with
a patentee putting claims at issue and then trying to withdraw some of
those claims from the suit. In Sheleore, Inc. v. Durham Industries,
Shelcore sued Durham alleging infringement of, among other things, U.S.
Patent No. 4,208,831 ('831 patent).68 Shelcore alleged infringement of the
'831 patent's claims 1-13.69 Durham counterclaimed for a declaratory
judgment of invalidity, unenforceability, and noninfringement.7 ° During
trial, Shelcore voluntarily withdrew, with prejudice, its infringement
allegation concerning claim 13 of the '831 patent.7 ' The district court
subsequently held that the prior art invalidated claims 1-12 of the '831
patent.72
When Shelcore reached appeal, the Federal Circuit reprimanded the
district court because the court did not consider the validity of claim 13.
The Federal Circuit explained that Shelcore could not "unilaterally remove
the validity issue because Durham's counterclaim put validity of all the
claims in issue.,

73

Nonetheless, it did not vacate or remand the case

because the record did not support the invalidity of claim 13, and therefore
it reasoned the district court's ruling could stand.74
Because of these two apparently divergent cases, district courts take
divergent paths concerning individual claims in a patent, covenants, or
stipulations, not to sue, and subject-matter jurisdiction.
But particularly noteworthy, in an analogous context, the Federal
Circuit discussed subject-matter jurisdiction concerning an individual
licensed patent claim. More specifically, in MetaboliteLaboratories,Inc.
v. LaboratoryCorp. ofnAmerican Holdings, the Federal Circuit discussed

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 906.
Grain Processing,840 F.2d at 906.
Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Id.
Id.
Id. at624.
Id. at 623-24.
Shelcore, 745 F.2d at 624.
Id.
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jurisdiction where one of several asserted patent claims was the subject of
a license."
In this instance, the patentee, Metabolite Laboratories (Metabolite),
alleged that Laboratory Corporation of America (Laboratory) infringed its
U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658 ('658 patent).76 The jury found that Laboratory
infringed the '658 patent's claims.77 It also found the patent valid.78 On a
motion for a judgment as a matter of law, the district court upheld, among
other things, the validity of claims 13 and 18. 7 9 On appeal, Laboratory
challenged the findings of infringement and validity. 80 While the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court's holding regarding claim 13's validity,
it vacated the ruling regarding claim 18's validity because the district court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over that claim.8
Particularly relevant to the case was the fact that unlike claim 13, the
parties had a license relevant to claim 18.82 The Court likened the license
to a covenant not to sue.83 It held that like a covenant not to sue, a license
strips a party of any reasonable apprehension of suit.84 Following its
75. See generallyMetabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. ofAm. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
76. Id. at 1359.
77. Id. at 1364-65.
78. Id. at 1359.
79. Id.
80. Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1359.
81. Id. at 1369.
82. Id. Notably, both parties agreed that they had a binding license concerning claim 18. Id.
83. Id. at 1369.
84. Id. Notably, the Supreme Court recently, in Medimmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc., held that
a party may still sue under the Declaratory Judgment Act challenging a patent's validity even where
a patent, or its claims, are subject of a license and royalty fees. 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007). Medimmune
paid royalties under protest. Id. at 768. The Supreme Court held that subject-matter jurisdiction
existed and Medimmune could sue under the Declaratory Judgment Act. It stated that, "promising
to pay royalties on patents that have not been held invalid does not amount to a promise" not to
challenge the patent. Id. at 776. While this decision could alter how the Federal Circuit must look
at licenses, it does not change their underlying analysis in Metabolite concerning the specific issue
of individual patent claims, namely separating claims and examining whether each individual claim
satisfied the requirements for subject-matter jurisdiction. But it does refute the Federal Circuit's
analogy that licenses and covenants not to sue similarly divest a court of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court, in Medimmune, clarified that a license does not equal a promise not to
challenge the patent. Id. Paying a license fee in protest puts a party at an adversarial position-they
are forfeiting money on a contract they believe concerns an invalid patent. With a covenant not to
sue, or stipulation of non-infringement, the parties arguably lack that adversarial element because
the non-patent holder may practice the invention without any payment of money (in the form of
royalties) or face a threat of suit. However, a question may arise whether a party may want to
invalidate that patent in any event so that the market may be flooded with more competitors who,
on their own, may represent smaller companies not in a position to challenge or comfortably
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precedent in Amana and Super Sack, the Court held that it lacked
jurisdiction over claim 18, but retained jurisdiction over claim 13.85 Thus,
in analyzing subject-matter jurisdiction over an individual patent claim
subject to a license, the Court drew no distinction, nor limited its prior
holdings such as Super Sack, because those cases concerned a covenant
not to sue on an entire patent in suit, as opposed to individual claims.
A. DistrictCourts 'Divergent Paths
Yet, despite this seemingly clear analysis and holding concerning
individual patent claims, district courts proffer differing views on whether
a court retains jurisdiction when individual claims of an asserted patent are
subject of a covenant or stipulation not to sue. While some courts
recognize covenants not to sue directed at individual patent claims as a
loss of subject-matter jurisdiction over those particular claims, others do
not.
B. District Courts That Retain Jurisdiction
An example of a district court that refused to relinquish subject-matter
jurisdiction over individual claims is the Delaware court in Syngenta
Seeds, Inc. v. Monsanto Co. 6 In this case, Syngenta sued Monsanto
alleging infringement of a portion of claims in U.S. Patent 6,403,865 ('865
patent).87 Monsanto counterclaimed alleging invalidity of both asserted
and unasserted patent claims.88 Syngenta filed for a voluntary dismissal of

question a patent's validity, but rather assume it is so until a larger company clearly invalidates it.
Then, in Sandisk, the Federal Circuit addressed the Supreme Court's air of disapproval in footnote
11 ofMedImmune, concerning the reasonable apprehension test. See supratext accompanying note
30. The Federal Circuit adopted a broader analysis that implicates more an adverse party-type
analysis. The Federal Circuit did not address the second part of the subj ect-matter jurisdiction test.
Id. But notably, neither footnote 11, nor the Sandisk case render moot the underlying principles of
this Article, namely that any test for jurisdiction should exist on a claim-by-claim analysis with
unique permutations when considering noninfringement, invalidity, and unenforceability
contentions and possible ways parties may "contract around" any test the Federal Circuit may
devise to avoid the appearance of adversarial parties with real interests at stake and thereby escape
declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
85. Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1358, 1360-69.
86. Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., No. Civ. 02-1331-SLR, 2004 WL 2790498 (D.
Del. Nov. 22, 2004).
87. Id. at*1 n.l.
88. Id.
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Monsanto's counterclaims concerning the validity of the unasserted
claims.89 The district court denied Syngenta's motion.9'
In denying Syngenta's motion, the district court relied upon Shelcore,
Inc. v. DurhamIndustrieswhile distinguishing Super Sack Manufacturing
Corp. v. Chase PackagingCorp.9 The district court distinguished Super
Sack by stating that,
Although the Federal Circuit, [in Super Sack], concluded that a
promise by a patentee not to assert patents against an infringer did
divest the trial court of jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment
because there was no longer a controversy, in that case the patentee
withdrew the entire patent from the controversy, not just discrete
claims. The court finds the distinction substantial.92
Thus, the district court found the distinction between an entire patent
versus individual claims, to be a substantial, perhaps even determinative,
distinction concerning the retention of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Syngenta court is not alone in its thinking. In Honeywell
International v. Universal Avionics Systems Corp., Honeywell sued
Avionics alleging infringement of two display patents, U.S. Patent Nos.
6,138,060 and 6,092,009 ('060 patent and '009 patent, respectively). 93
Honeywell alleged infringement of all claims in the two patents.94
Avionics counterclaimed seeking a declaratory judgment of
noninfringement and invalidity.95 During its response to Avionics'
summary judgment motions, Honeywell withdrew, and stipulated in
writing, that it had no present or future intention to pursue infringement of
certain previously asserted claims. 96 After this act, only claims 27-33 of
the '009 patent and claims 4 and 5 of the '060 remained asserted against
Avionics. 97
Yet despite Honeywell's stipulation not to sue over certain claims, the
district court maintained that it had subject-matterjurisdiction to determine
the validity of all the patents' claims, relying heavily on Bioacore v.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Syngenta, 2004 WL 2790498, at *1 n.1.
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Univ. Avionics Sys. Corp., 288 F. Supp. 2d 638,641-42 (D. Del.
2003) (magistrate decision).
94. Id. at 644 (Avionics collectively referring to Sandel and Universal).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 644 n.15.
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Thermo Bioanalysis Corp.98 In doing so, the district court observed that
Honeywell continued to pursue infringement of claims 27-33 and 4 and 5
in the two patents.99 The district court stated that reasonable apprehension
existed because, in part, these remaining claims depended upon the
withdrawn independent claims. 100

Notably, the district court distinguished Grain Processing as a case
where the "plaintiff had completely abandoned its infringement charge"
and no dependent claims from them remained in suit while Honeywell
continued to assert infringement of certain dependant claims."'
Accordingly, the district court analyzed °2the validity of all the claims
Honeywell originally asserted in its suit.

Not all courts follow the reasoning of these cases. Other district courts
found that a court does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction over
individual claims subject to a covenant or stipulation not to sue.
C. DistrictCourts That Divest Jurisdiction
For example, in Biogen, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., the district court found
that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over certain originally asserted
and non-asserted claims when Biogen limited its infringement allegations
to two patent claims and stipulated it would not sue on any of the
remaining claims.' 03 The district court held that this representation mooted
any reasonable apprehension Amgen could face over the withdrawn patent
claims."° The district court held that given Biogen's representation that it
would relinquish the right to sue Amgen, except on the two particular
patent claims, Amgen's counterclaim for invalidity and unenforceability
of any other claims in the asserted patents would be dismissed.0 5 Relying
in part upon GrainProcessingand Super Sack, the district court refused
because it determined that it
to determine the validity of other0 claims
6
jurisdiction.
subject-matter
lacked

98. Honeywell, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 644-45; Biacore v. Thermo Bioanalysis Corp., 79 F. Supp.
2d 422 (D. Del. 1999).
99. Honeywell, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 645.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 645-61.
103. Biogen, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 35, 39-40 (D. Mass. 1996).
104. Id. at 40. See also WM Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, No. 04 C 0346,
2004 WL 2616300, at *1 (N.D. III. 2004) ("Honeywell asserted the whole patent and withdrew
certain claims late in the litigation").
105. Biogen, 913 F. Supp. at 40.
106. Id.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW& POLICY

[Vol. 12

In Lifetime Products,Inc. v. Correll,Inc., the district court also found
that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over certain individual claims in
light of a covenant not to sue.0 7 Lifetime sued Correll alleging
infringement of several patents.108 In particular, Lifetime alleged
infringement of claims 19, 34, 37, and 39-43 of U.S. Patent No. 6,530,331
('331 patent).'0 9 Correll sought a declaratory judgment concerning, among
other things, invalidity of claims 39-43 of the '331 patent."0 After Correll
moved for summary judgment for invalidity of these claims, Lifetime
executed a covenant not to sue on those specific claims and sought a
dismissal of the invalidity allegations."' The district court granted the
dismissal stating that the "covenant not to sue eliminates the court's
subject-matter jurisdiction over claims 39-43.''112 But, it retained
jurisdiction over claims 19, 34, and 37. The court relied upon Super Sack,
drawing no distinction from the fact that the covenant in Super Sack
concerned
a patent in its entirety, and not individual claims within a
3
patent. '

D. Analysis of Subject-MatterJurisdictionand Individual Claims
As stated previously, when a party files a declaratory judgment action,
subject-matter jurisdiction is based upon the presence of a case or
controversy." 4 In patent litigation, the two-part test for establishing a case
or controversy entails: (1) an explicit threat or other action by the patentee,
which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory
judgment plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit, and (2) present
activity which could constitute infringement or concrete steps taken with
the intent to conduct such activity.'15
When a patentee sues another party for infringement, the patentee may
allege infringement of one or more of a patent's claims." 6 The defendant,
107. Lifetime Prods., Inc. v. Correll, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1151 (D. Utah 2004).
108. Id. at 1132.
109. Id.at 1144, 1148, & 1151.
110. Id.at 1151 (Correll collectively referring to defendants FDL, Inc. and Correll, Inc.).
111. Id.
112. Lifetime Prods., 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1151.
113. See id.
114. Jervis B.Webb Co.v.S.Sys., Inc., 742 F.2d 1388, 1398 (Fed.Cir. 1984).
115. BP Chems. Ltd. v.Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed.Cir. 1993).
116. WM Wrigley Jr. Co.v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC,No. 04 C 0346, 2004 WL 2616300,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2004) ("As the patentee, Wrigley has the right to determine what claims
to litigate"). In addition to determining what to litigate, they also enjoy the right to choose when
to litigate. See Bioxy, Inc. v. Birko Corp., 935 F. Supp. 737, 743 (E.D.N.C. 1996) ("[P]atentees
enjoy a right to determine when they wish to sue for infringement") (citation omitted).
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in turn, may counterclaim and allege noninfringement, invalidity, and
unenforceability of the originally asserted and unasserted claims under the
Declaratory Judgment Act.1 17 But only when a defendant meets the case
and controversy requirement-i.e. the two-part test-may a court entertain
the declaratory judgment motion over the patent claims.118
Neither Super Sack, Shelcore, nor Grain Processing stand for the
proposition that a promise or stipulation by a patentee not to sue divests a
court's jurisdiction only when the patentee withdraws all of the patent's
claims from the controversy. Such a limitation thwarts the basic and
fundamental principles of subject-matter jurisdiction in patent law and the
Declaratory Judgment Act.
Instead, the proper question a court must ask is: (1) does the party
seeking a declaratory judgment face a reasonable apprehension of suit
concerning each patent claim, and (2) is that party infringing, or has it
taken concrete steps towards infringing, each patent claim? When a
covenant not to sue or stipulation of noninfringement concerns one patent
claim among many, the answer to the first question is no for that particular
claim, and a court must reconcile that with any asserted noninfringement,
invalidity, or unenforceability contentions under the Declaratory Judgment
Act.
Some basic principles of patent law as established by the Federal
Circuit support evaluating each patent claim that is the subject of a
covenant or stipulation not to sue, with unique considerations based on
whether the declaratory judgment concerns invalidity, noninfringement,
or unenforceability.
First, the Federal Circuit held that a declaratory judgment case or
controversy exists on a patent claim-by-patent claim basis.'1 9 This is
because each patent claim represents its own invention. Second, the
Federal Circuit reasons that because each patent claim represents an
individual invention, it requires its own validity analysis. 20 Third, even

117. Jervis, 742 F.2d at 1399 n.8 (dismissing declaratory judgment claims for invalidity
concerning unasserted patent claims where declaratoryjudgment movant did not meet second factor
in the two-prong test with respect to those unasserted patent claims).
118. Id. (citing Plastic Container Corp. v. Cont'l Plastics of Okla., Inc., 607 F.2d 885, 891 n.7,
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980) and Flakice Corp. v. Liquid Freeze Corp., 131 F. Supp. 599
(N.D. Cal. 1955)).
119. Id. at 1399 (dismissing declaratory judgment claims for invalidity concerning unasserted
patent claims where declaratory judgment movant did not meet second factor in the two-part test
with respect to those unasserted patent claims).
120. Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 621, 625 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("[A] party
challenging the validity of a claim, absent a pretrial agreement or stipulation [that invalidity of one
amounts to invalidity of all], must submit evidence supporting a conclusion of invalidity of each
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though a party may infringe an independent claim, it may not necessarily
infringe a dependent claim because that party may not infringe the
dependant's claims added limitations. 12' Conversely, when a court finds
noninfringement of an independent claim, noninfringement of a dependent
claim generally follows. 122 Fourth, with respect to unenforceability, there
is a unique unity to all patent claims because one claim tainted with
inequitable conduct during its prosecution renders the entire patent
unenforceable. 123
But while these tenets support individual claim evaluation, the
reconciliation between noninfringement, invalidity, and unenforceability
contentions under the Declaratory Judgment Act differ slightly.
1. Where Syngenta Went Wrong: Invalidity Contentions Require
Individual Patent Claim Examinations
While the district court in Syngenta v. Monsanto might have reached
the proper conclusion, its flawed reasoning introduces confusion into the
legal area of subject-matterjurisdiction and individual patent claims. More
specifically, the district court's distinction of Super Sack in its refusal to
dismiss Monsanto's declaratory judgment counterclaims relating to the
validity of unasserted patent claims, introduced this flawed reasoning.' 24
The district court distinguished Super Sack on the basis that the patentee's

claim the challenger seeks to destroy.") (emphasis in original); Dow Chem. Co. v. Mee Indus., Inc.,
341 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("Neither the district court in its opinion, nor the parties in
their briefs have paid sufficient attention to the specific language of the individual claims, or the
proper construction of those claims."); Dayco Prods. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358,
1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding that the district court erred by not addressing validity of each claim
separately where no substantially, materially identical validity issue). See also 35 U.S.C. § 282
(2000).
[E]ach claim of a patent (whether in independent, dependent, or multiple
dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other
claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even
though dependent upon an invalid claim.... The burden of establishing invalidity
of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting invalidity.
35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
121. See, e.g., Orr v. Patagonia, Inc., 3:05-CV-0634-G, 2006 WL 2780046, at *5 (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 26, 2006) (explaining that even if infringement of independent claims is found, examination
must then proceed to dependant claims).
122. Wahpeton Canvas Co., Inc. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1552 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
123. Lummus Indus., Inc. v. D.M. & E. Corp., 862 F.2d 267, 274 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
124. Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., No. Civ. 02-13311-SLR, 2004 WL 2790498, at
*1 n.1 (D. Del. Nov. 22, 2004).
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promise not to sue in that case, which resulted in a lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, concerned the patent in its entirety, and not individual patent
claims.' 25 Thus, it held that Super Sack bore no relevance to Syngenta's
case.
Instead, the district court relied upon Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham
Industries,Inc. for support. But in doing so, it drew improper conclusions
from Shelcore and then improperly used them as restrictions on the scope
of Super Sack.
As previously discussed, in the Shelcore case, Shelcore originally
asserted claims 1-13 of its patent against Durham.1 26 Then much later, in
the middle of the trial, Shelcore voluntarily withdrew its allegation of
infringement with respect to claim 13.127 The facts in Shelcore do not
indicate that Shelcore entered a covenant not to sue, or that the doctrines
of res judicata or collateral estoppel would alone have necessarily
precluded a future suit on claim 13.12' Thus, Durham might have faced a
reasonable apprehension of future suit and met the two-part declaratory
subject-matter jurisdiction
judgment test concerning claim
129 13, justifying
over its invalidity contention.
Notably, the Federal Circuit's somewhat conclusory finding in
Shelcore makes no mention of reasonable apprehension of suit, but simply
stated that a party could not unilaterally remove the validity issue of one
claim when it had placed all the claims in issue. 130 But even if Shelcore
placed all the claims in issue, it stands to reason that if Shelcore
subsequently entered a covenant not to sue concerning some of those
claims, a court would lack subject-matter jurisdiction to determine the
validity over those particular patent claims. The Shelcore opinion does not
teach otherwise, it simply did not address that particular situation.
In contrast to Shelcore, the patentee in Syngenta wanted the district
court to dismiss a declaratory judgment for invalidity ofunasserted claims,
i.e., claims Syngenta never alleged were infringed.13 ' Notably, nothing in
the facts suggested that Monsanto faced reasonable apprehension

125. Id.
126. Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
127. Id. at 624.
128. See SGS Tools Co. v. Step Tools Unlimited, Inc., No. 5:04CV1315,2006 WL 2849771,
at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2006) (discussing that because a party entered a covenant not to sue in
a patent case the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata prevented asserting such a claim
against Defendant in the future).
129. Shelcore, 745 F.2d at 623-24.
130. Id. at 624.
131. See supratext accompanying note 125.
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concerning those unasserted claims using the Federal Circuit's two-part
test.
But even if it had, the Syngenta court should have initially proceeded
on the two-part analysis to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction
13 2
existed over Monsanto's invalidity contentions of the unasserted claims.
If the Syngenta court found that subject-matterjurisdiction initially existed
over those unasserted patent claims, any subsequent covenant, stipulation,
or promise not to sue by Syngenta for particular claims, whether
previously asserted or not, ought to have been reviewed in light of Super
Sack and Grain Processing.133 The Federal Circuit in Grain Processing
clearly stated that a court lacks subject-matterjurisdiction to determine the
validity of individual claims in a declaratory judgment action, even though
other claims from the same patent remained in suit, where the declaratory
judgment movant
faces no reasonable apprehension of suit over those
34
certain claims. 1
Because whether a case or controversy exists on a patent claim-bypatent claim analysis, any patent invalidity analysis must be conducted on
a patent claim-by-patent claim basis, and because covenants not to sue
dispel reasonable apprehension, they can divest a court's jurisdiction over
individual patent claims. Entertaining a validity analysis for an individual
claim that the patentee does not currently, nor will in the future, assert
represents an impermissible advisory opinion with respect to that claim.
2. Where Honeywell Went Wrong: Noninfringement Contentions
Require Individual Patent Claim Examinations
Likewise, the court's failure in Honeywell International, Inc. v.
UniversalAvionicsSystems, Corp. to apply a properjurisdictional analysis
introduced confusion into the legal area of subj ect-matter jurisdiction and
individual patent claims. The Honeywell court found that Avionics faced
reasonable apprehension because Honeywell continued to allege

132. Jervis B. Webb Co. v. S.Sys., Inc., 742 F.2d 1388, 1399 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("Since Webb
only asserted and litigated the infringement of claims 1, 3, 4, 8, 9 and 11, and the evidence in the
record is inadequate to indicate the existence of a case or controversy regarding the remaining
claims in the invalidity declaratory judgment counterclaim, we vacate that portion ...regarding
the invalidity of claims 2, 5-7, 10 and 12.").
133. See, e.g., id. at 1399 n.8 (noting subject-matter jurisdiction possible over unasserted
claims where (1) patentee makes general accusations of infringement not limited to certain claims,
(2) complaint asserted all claims, and (3) complaint asserted less than all claims of a patent, but
declaratory plaintiff able to meet case and controversy requirement for all claims, or (4) where
proof of fraud, derivation, supports invalidity of all claims).
134. Grain Processing v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902, 906 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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infringement of dependant patent claims, though stipulating in writing its
then present and future intent not to pursue infringement of other
originally asserted independent claims.'35 The Honeywell court generally
held that because Honeywell's stipulation concerned only certain
originally asserted claims while others remained in litigation, Avionics
faced reasonable apprehension."' This reasoning fails.
The Honeywell court relied on Biacorev. Thermo BioanalysisCorp. for
the idea that because "litigation remains on certain dependant claims of the
recently withdrawn independent claims," Avionics faced a reasonable
apprehension of suit. 137 Though the Honeywell court did not go deeper into
this line of reasoning, it may be centered on the idea that one who
infringes a dependent claim necessarily infringes the independent claim
from which the dependant claim stems. 3 Therefore, a party could not
reasonably stipulate to noninfringement of an independent claim while
pursuing infringement of a dependent claim. The Federal Circuit did not
address this exact issue in either GrainProcessingor Metabolite because
none of the remaining claims depended upon the ones withdrawn.
But the district court in Biogen v. Amgen did address this issue and
drew a reasonable conclusion, though it may be more a matter of form than
substance.' 39 The district court noted Biogen's correct observation that
although it could, and did, stipulate that it would not sue in the future for
any remaining claims in the patent, it could not stipulate to
noninfringement of those same claims because that stipulation would
140
prevent it from litigating the dependent claims that remained in suit.
Thus, the Biogen court avoided the possible contradiction of a
noninfringement stipulation for an independent claim while litigating a
dependant claim by framing this type of stipulation as a stipulation not to
sue.

135. Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Univ. Avionics Sys. Corp., 288 F. Supp. 2d 638, 644 (D. Del.
2003).
136. The Honeywell court also cites Grain Processing,but for an incorrect proposition. The
Honeywell court stated that in Grain Processing the plaintiff completely abandoned its
infringement charge. Id. at 645. But, in Grain Processing, the plaintiff only abandoned its
infringement charge concerning 10 process claims of the patent in suit, not the 4 product claims.
GrainProcessing, 840 F.2d at 906.
137. Honeywell, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 645 (citing Biacore v. Thermo Bioanalysis Corp., 79 F.
Supp. 2d 422, 454 (D. Del. 1999) (reasoning that, "[m]oreover, the fact that Thermo is currently
litigating allegations of infringement as to dependent claims 4 and 5 of the same patent further
supports that apprehension.")).
138. Wahpeton Canvas Co., Inc. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1552 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
139. Biogen, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 35, 39 (D. Mass. 1996).
140. Id. at 40 n.7.
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If the Honeywell court was concerned about this sort of contradiction,
then the reasoning used in Biogen seems appropriate. Thus, while
Honeywell could not, arguably, stipulate to noninfringement of the
withdrawn independent claims, and nothing indicates it did as much,
Honeywell could, and apparently did, stipulate its intent not to sue on the
withdrawn claims.'41 This action should have removed subject-matter
jurisdiction over determining the validity of the withdrawn patent claims.
Moreover, to the extent that Honeywell relies upon Biacore,a notable
distinction can be made. The Biacore court also addressed the issue of a
declaratory judgment and subject-matter jurisdiction. But in finding that
the court retained jurisdiction, it stated in its analysis that, "This court
previously has held that the absence of a formal covenant not to sue or a
willingness to accept a judgment of noninfringement creates a reasonable
apprehension of suit."' 42 In Biacore, the patentee offered no formal
covenant or stipulation not to sue with respect to the claims subject of the
declaratory judgment.'43 As such, the Biacore court held that reasonable
apprehension existed and it had subject-matter jurisdiction."
In sharp contrast, Honeywell's written representations concerning its
stipulation not to sue currently or in the future satisfied the requirement
that was absent in Biacore. In fact, the Federal Circuit held that even
where a party has not filed a formal covenant or stipulation not to sue,
promises in court papers and representations to a court suffice to strip a
party of reasonable apprehension. '
Thus, from a thorough a review of Federal Circuit and district court
case law, a conclusion can be reached that a court lacks jurisdiction to
determine noninfringement of individual patent claims subject to a
covenant not to sue. Notably, a caveat exists when dependant claims
remain in suit. Namely, any stipulation concerning the independent claims
must be formed as a covenant not to sue as opposed to a stipulation of
noninfringement.
3. Where Biogen Has Gone: Unenforceability Contentions and
Individual Patent Claims Require Special Considerations
In addition to invalidity and noninfringement contentions, a declaratory
judgment movant may also allege that the patent is unenforceable due to
141. Honeywell, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 644.
142. Biacore,79 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1059-60 (Fed.
Cir. 1995); Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902, 906 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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inequitable conduct. Inequitable conduct during the prosecution of any
claim in the patent renders the entire patent unenforceable.146 Given this
close cause and effect among patent claims, declaratory judgments for
unenforceability warrant additional scrutiny.
While neither Grain Processing nor Metabolite addressed this
particular issue, a review of Federal Circuit case law on inequitable
conduct generally, and district court cases in particular, assist in analyzing
the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction of claims subject to a covenant not
to sue in light of inequitable conduct allegations.' 47 When a declaratory
judgment movant meets the two-part declaratory judgment test stated
above they can allege, among other things, that the patent is
unenforceable. 48 As previously stated, inequitable conduct during
prosecution of even one claim renders an entire patent unenforceable.149 In
light of the analysis above it might follow that, where a patentee limits a
court's jurisdiction over certain claims with a covenant not to sue or
stipulation of noninfringment, the court lacks jurisdiction to determine
whether the patentee committed inequitable conduct in procuring those
particular claims. However, this could lead to inequity.
For instance, assume a patentee has a patent with 10 claims. Further
assume that two of those claims were procured through inequitable
conduct. A patentee may try to delimit a court's inquiry into those two
claims, which could otherwise lead to a finding of inequitable conduct, by
stipulating not to sue on those two claims. The patentee could hope that
this would remove a court's jurisdiction over those two claims. At the
same time, the patentee could assert infringement allegations for the

146. Supra text accompanying note 123.
147. Though the Court in GrainProcessingheld the 4 remaining product claims valid in light
of an allegation of inequitable conduct, the court did not discuss whether possible inequitable
conduct concerning the 10 withdrawn process claims affected the product claims analysis or would
render the entire patent unenforceable. GrainProcessing,840 F.2d at 906-07. Metaboliteconcerned
a declaratory plaintiff who continued to make payments pursuant to a license, the court holding that
such action estopped the declaratory plaintiff from challenging the validity of the patent,
unenforceability not being an issue discussed. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am.
Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
148. See U.S.C.A. § 282 (2002) ("The following shall be defenses in any action involving the
validity or infringement of a patent... : (1) Noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement
or unenforceability .. "); Weatherchem Corp. v. J.L. Clark, Inc., 163 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(explaining that "[A] counterclaim for a declaration of unenforceability affects the entire patent");
see also Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
149. Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 877; see also Intellectual Prop. Dev. v. TCI Cablevision of CA,
248 F.3d 1333, 1342 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting no difference in case or controversy analysis
where entire patent subject to covenant not to sue and declaratoryjudgment sought unenforceability
in addition to noninfringement and invalidity).
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remaining eight patent claims that were not inequitably procured claims.
If a court did not look into inequitable conduct allegations with respect to
the two claims subject of the covenant not to sue, a patentee could
selectively assert claims and collect damages on an otherwise
unenforceable patent.
Though the Federal Circuit did not address this issue in Grain
Processingor Metbolite, the district court in Biogen faced this argument.
It cured the possible inequity by allowing the parties to explore, during
discovery, the issue of inequitable conduct regarding claims subject to the
covenant not to sue. 5 ' The Biogen court distinguished unenforceability
from invalidity, explaining that an inequitable conduct defense bears no
dependency on litigating validity.
The Biogen court relied on Jervis B. Webb Co. v. Southern Systems,
Inc., for support. There, the Federal Circuit addressed, among other things,
subject-matter jurisdiction and patents.1 5' In this case, Jervis asserted
infringement of only a portion of the patent's claims. 52 Southern filed a
declaratory judgment action alleging that all 12 claims of the patent in suit
lacked validity.'53 The district court invalidated all of the claims as obvious
in light of the prior art. 154 The Federal Circuit vacated part of this ruling
because the district court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over the
155
claims, except for those claims Jervis sued on.
While the Federal Circuit made this ruling, it cautioned against the
scope of the holding, and explained in a footnote that fraud, among other
factual circumstances, gives a court subject-matter jurisdiction to
invalidate all of a patent's claims, even those that did not present a
reasonable apprehension of suit. 156 But this footnote lacks complete clarity.
That is, it could allow either (a) jurisdiction to allow discovery and hear
evidence concerning claims that initially had subject-matter
jurisdiction-and if those particular claims resulted from fraud-then
extending any fraudulent finding to all of the patent's claims; or (b)
jurisdiction to allow a party to proceed with discovery concerning fraud
allegations for all of the patent's claims, regardless of whether they posed

150. Biogen, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 35, 38 (D. Mass. 1996).
151. See generally Jervis B. Webb Co. v. S. Sys., Inc., 742 F.2d 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
152. Id. at 1399 (observing that Jervis only asserted and litigated claims 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, and 11).
153. Id.at 1391.
154. Id. at 1391-92.
155. Id.at 1399.
156. Jervis, 742 F.2d at 1399 n.8 ("Nor does the present holding preclude a declaratory
judgment that all claims are invalid when the proof at trial establishes a basis, e.g., fraud,
derivation, for such judgment.").
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a reasonable apprehension of suit. The Biogen court appears to embrace
157
the latter interpretation and analogize fraud to inequitable conduct.
Additionally, the Biogen court also relied upon the district court case
Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation v. Genentech to support its
decision to allow discovery into all claims in response to inequitable
conduct allegations. 58 In Scripps, the district court found evidence of
inequitable conduct.' 59 But the district court held that while a
determination of inequitable conduct rendered an entire patent
unenforceable, the court only had jurisdiction over the claims where a
reasonable apprehension of suit existed. 60 Therefore, the court only held
certain asserted claims of a reissue patent unenforceable-though
inequitable conduct rendered the entire patent unenforceable as a matter
of law.
Interestingly, although the district court in Scripps stated that it could
only determine the validity of claims where Scripps alleged infringement,
the court qualified that statement with the proviso that it did not intend that
statement as a ruling on any incidental effect that a court's order may have
on the remaining claims.' 6 '
If the Scripps court did not intend to limit incidental effects of any
validity ruling on remaining claims at issue, one might expect that the
same intention would apply to claims concerning unenforceability. That
is, if one claim were found unenforceable due to inequitable conduct, the
incidental effect would be that the entire patent is void due to that
inequitable conduct.

157. Biogen, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 35, 38 n.4. (D. Mass. 1996) (noting that
inequitable conduct does not equal "fraud;" one may not commit "fraud" upon the Patent Office,
otherwise stated, one cannot breach their duty of candor, good faith, or fair dealing). See Broyhill
Furniture Indus., Inc. v. Craftmaster Furniture Corp., 12 F.3d 1080, 1085 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
("Conduct before the PTO that may render a patent unenforceable is best referred to as 'inequitable
conduct,' not fraud."); see also Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., Inc., 759 F.2d 10,
12 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
InJ.P.Stevens & Co., Inc. v. Lex Tex Ltd., Inc., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559, 223 USPQ
1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1984), this court adopted the terminology "inequitable
conduct" to identify a breach of the duty of candor to the PTO in order to make
it clear that such malfeasance is to be distinguished from common law "fraud."
Id.
158.
159.
1989).
160.
161.

Biogen, 913 F. Supp. at 38.
Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, 707 F. Supp. 1547, 1555-57 (N.D. Cal.
Id. at 1549, 1557 n.15.
Id. at 1549 n.3.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW& POLICY

[Vol. 12

The Scripps court did not go that far. More specifically, when
determining that Scripps engaged in inequitable conduct, the court limited
62
the reach of its unenforceability holding to only those claims at issue.'
The court explained that even though inequitable conduct renders an entire
patent unenforceable, "the Court has jurisdiction
only over those claims
' 63
with respect to which infringement is alleged.'
Given the unique nature of patent claims' interdependency with respect
to inequitable conduct, a court should retain jurisdiction over the patent in
its entirety, and if it makes a finding of unenforceability based upon the
claims that gave rise to subject-matter jurisdiction, all claims should be
found unenforceable. Certainly, validity and inequitable conduct constitute
different legal concepts. 1" But not allowing a court to find a patent
unenforceable in its entirety, but rather only on select claims, creates an
anomaly in the law.
If one applies the reasoning in Scripps to a hypothetical case, the
inconsistency becomes apparent. Assume all claims of a patent that had
five claims are asserted against an alleged infringer. In response, the
alleged infringer files a declaratory judgment counterclaim that the patent
is unenforceable. The patentee then stipulates that it will not sue with
respect to claims 3, 4, and 5. The defendant, nonetheless, can
unequivocally prove the patentee committed inequitable conduct in
prosecuting claim 3. This inequitable conduct renders the entire patent
unenforceable.
But, following Scripps, and possibly Biogen, a court would not give a
judgment ofunenforceability on claim 3, or the patent in whole, but would
limit its finding of unenforceability only to claims 1 and 2. This is so, even
though, in finding claims 1 and 2 unenforceable, a court necessarily made
a preliminary finding and judgment with respect to claim 3, regardless of
its jurisdiction only over claims 1 and 2. Thus, given the uniquely intimate
and inter-dependant relationship between claims in a patent and
inequitable conduct, a court should retain jurisdiction over all patent
claims despite any covenant or stipulation not to sue. At the same time,
however, use of a covenant not to sue ought not to, by itself, create an

162. Id. at 1557.
163. Id.at 1557 n.15.
164. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559,
1569 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[P]roving inequitable conduct does not 'invalidate' a patent. Rather, it
renders the patent unenforceable.... Although the practical effect may be the same, the legal
concepts are quite different.").
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adverse inference that a patentee committed inequitable conduct during
prosecution of those claims.165
As the Federal Circuit explained, "when inequitable conduct occurs in
relation to one claim the entire patent is unenforceable," but this does not
mean that "courts may not look outside the involved claim in determining,
in the first place, whether inequitable conduct did in fact occur. Claims are
not born, and do not live, in isolation. Each is related to other claims, to
the specification and drawings, to the prior art, to an attorney's remarks,
to co-pending and continuing applications, and often... to earlier or later
versions of itself in light of amendments made to it.' ' 166 A covenant not to
sue should not divest a court of jurisdiction to consider these factors, or
make an improper limited finding of unenforceability.
Though an asserted claim may not have been procured through
inequitable conduct, a claim subject to a covenant not to sue might have
been. Because of the integral link between all patent claims and the
defense of unenforceability, a declaratory judgment for unenforceability
ought to remain within a court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Unlike
invalidity or noninfringement, where each claim retains a unique
independent analysis, inequitable conduct of one claim renders the entire
patent unenforceable. The penultimate concern, i.e. that a court not render
an advisory opinion, becomes moot in the inequitable conduct context
where one inequitably procured claim renders the entire patent
unenforceable as a matter of law.
Though IntellectualPropertynotes that the subject matter jurisdiction
analysis applies for infringement, invalidity, and unenforceability, it did
not distinguish between individual patent claims and a patent in its
entirety. 167 Intellectual Property concerned a patent in its entirety. The
Federal Circuit did not address this distinction. In the case, the declaratory
plaintiff faced no apprehension of suit for any claim because the entire
patent was the subject of a covenant. The Court left unanswered whether
a court lacks jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment counterclaim of
unenforceability for a single covenanted claim because it was not faced
with that question.
A declaratory plaintiff s apprehension remains where a patentee carves
out certain claims via a covenant not to sue and leaves others in suit. It

165. Cf Kingsdown Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
("A requirement for disclaimer or reissue to avoid adverse inferences [of inequitable conduct]
would merely encourage the present proliferation of inequitable conduct charges.").
166. Id.at 874.
167. Seegenerally Intellectual Prop. Dev. v. TCI Cablevision of CA, Inc., 248 F.3d 1333 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
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clearly faces reasonable apprehension from those claims that remain in the
suit. A court ought to keep jurisdiction to decide whether an entire patent
is unenforceable due to inequitable conduct so long as at least one claim
meets the two-part declaratory judgment subject-matter jurisdiction test.
This is because inequitable conduct in procuring any one claim renders an
entire patent unenforceable.
VIII. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, when a party files a covenant not to sue, stipulation to
noninfringement or non-liability, or promises not to sue on individual
patent claims of an asserted patent, a court lacks jurisdiction to determine
a declaratory judgment action concerning the validity and noninfringement
of those particular claims. Notably, where dependent claims remain, a
party must condition its covenant, stipulation, or promise as one not to sue
as opposed to simply noninfringement of the covenanted independent
claims. Further, a court ought to keep jurisdiction with respect to a
declaratory judgment counterclaim concerning inequitable conduct and
should not allow a covenant not to sue on certain claims, while others
remain in suit, to affect its analysis or determination as to the patent's
enforceability. In that instance, the court should allow discovery into the
claims subject to inequitable conduct allegations and retain jurisdiction to
find the entire patent unenforceable.

